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Abstract
This paper investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a com-
munity affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from
renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden irrespective of local market
conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. “Homeowner communities” may
hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. Using
granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census
and historical war damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeown-
ership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge
significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their popula-
tion is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax
salience as the key mechanism behind this effect. We find positive spatial depen-
dence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.
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This paper investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a com-
munity affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from
renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden irrespective of local market
conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. “Homeowner communities” may
hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. Using
granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census
and historical war damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeown-
ership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge
significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their popula-
tion is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax
salience as the key mechanism behind this effect. We find positive spatial depen-
dence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, taxing housing wealth forms an important source of fiscal revenue for
local governments.1 Due to the immobility of the tax base, residential property taxes are
also generally considered to score high from a tax efficiency perspective (Wilson, 2006).
Their actual efficiency, however, hinges critically upon the political economy of property
taxation, which is concerned with the decisions of whom, how and how much to tax.
Property taxes are levied on both owner-occupiers and renters, but the perception
and true economic burden differ substantially between these two groups.2 According to
the “home voter hypothesis” first coined by Fischel (2001), especially households who
own their homes are expected to oppose high local property taxes. Homeowners have
strong incentives to promote high market values for the typically biggest item in their
wealth portfolios. Recent research suggests that the unpopularity of property taxes among
homeowners also results from higher salience: in many countries, the property tax tends to
be much more visible for homeowners than for renters.3 Renters sometimes even underlie
the illusion of not paying property taxes at all (Oates, 2005).
If homeowners oppose property taxes more strongly than renters, “homeowner com-
munities” — i.e., jurisdictions with large shares of households owning their homes — are
expected to tax property less heavily than governments of otherwise comparable com-
munities. This paper makes use of a previously untapped and highly detailed data set
to empirically investigate this hypothesis. The backbone of this data set is a complete
inventory of residential real estate compiled in the 2011 German Census. For each indi-
1Total revenue of the Type B German Property Tax (levied on non-agricultural property, including
improvements to land) amounted to 13.26 billion euros in 2016, according to Federal Statistical Office.
This corresponds to 323 euros per dwelling and about one-sixth of total municipal tax revenue. The
relative importance of property taxes is even larger in Anglo-Saxon and also many other OECD countries,
see Norregaard (2013) for in-depth discussion.
2Landlords are often statutorily allowed to shift the property tax to their tenants on a pro rata basis.
Local market conditions may however preclude that property taxes are fully shifted forward onto renters
in many locations in economic terms.
3German homeowners annually receive a discrete property tax bill from their municipality. For renters,
the tax usually appears among many other cost positions in the annual utilities statement, which comes
from their landlords. Other positions include insurance, waste collection, housekeeping etc.
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vidual housing unit, the inventory collected information about the type of owner and the
current state of use. We aggregate this data to the level of municipalities, which typically
rank between U.S. Census Tracts and Census Block Groups in terms of population size.
We merge this data with local property tax multipliers and rich information from local
property tax statistics, fiscal accounts, income tax statistics, labor statistics and federal
elections. Our final data set covers a cross-section of 8,036 Western German municipal-
ities4 and contains information on local fiscal conditions, socioeconomic characteristics,
economic prosperity and political tastes.
One key contribution of our paper is a clear identification of causality running from
local homeownership rates to property tax multipliers. To this end, our empirical anal-
ysis exploits two unique institutional circumstances of the German housing market. We
first make use of the missing link between the size of the local property tax base and
actual housing market values in the special design of the German property tax. This
special design guarantees that choosing the local multiplier is the only way by which lo-
cal governments can influence their property tax revenue. Second, we exploit historical
information on housing damages during the Second World War. Such damages led to
large-scale provision of rental housing in areas affected by warfare, having long-lasting ef-
fects on homeownership independent from local public financing. This natural experiment
provides exogenous variation that we use for causal inference about the homeowner effect.5
Based on spatial autoregressive models, we simultaneously account for the possibility of
strategic interdependence among municipalities’ property tax choices.
In comparison to the rich literature on strategic spatial interaction in local property
taxation, the role of property rights in driving property taxes has been subject to a
very limited number of studies. Existing attempts (see, e.g., Roche, 1986; Oates, 2005;
Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen, 2015) have been plagued by issues of identification and
4We do not include Eastern German municipalities due to data constraints on several important variables.
5In contrast to many other industrialized economies, regional homeownership rates in Germany often lie
below 50 percent, see Lerbs and Oberst (2014) for further discussion.
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statistical control. We contribute to this strand of literature by asking whether and how
strongly the local rate of homeownership causally affects property taxation across a very
large sample of local jurisdictions. By providing further evidence supportive of spatial
dependence in local property tax multipliers, our study also contributes to the spatial
interaction literature in property tax setting (see, e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001;
Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Lyytika¨inen, 2012).
We approach the question of a homeowner effect in the presence of spatial inter-
action in property tax rates among jurisdictions along two dimensions. We first develop
a yardstick competition model of local property taxation, which serves as basis for the
formulation of three key research hypotheses. We subsequently test these hypotheses in
an integrated spatial econometric framework that links local property tax multipliers to
local proportions of owner-occupied housing and neighboring localities’ multipliers. We
use an extensive set of possibly confounding variables in order to control for local fiscal
conditions, socioeconomic structure and political colouring. Our identification strategy
explicitly tackles the endogeneity problem among local property tax and homeowner share
in a spatial instrumental variable setting.
Our results suggest that local governments indeed tax homeowner communities dif-
ferently compared to otherwise comparable communities. Depending on the exact specifi-
cation, a hypothetical rise in a local jurisdiction’s homeownership rate by ten percentage
points decreases the local property tax multiplier by an average direct effect of 2-3 points.
This key result remains unchanged when spatial dependence in tax multipliers and en-
dogeneity among homeownership and property taxes is accounted for. Calculating the
average total effect of a hypothetical change in homeownership, we estimate that local
tax multipliers would be on average 6-7 points lower in the case of a global rise in home-
ownership of ten percentage points across all jurisdictions in the sample. Such a reduction
in local multipliers would correspond to an annual tax loss of 120-140 million euros, or
one percent of total property tax revenue.
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An interesting implication of our finding is that actual levels of residential property
taxation may not be efficient from a social welfare perspective. If homeowners successfully
manage to oppose high property taxes relative to other sources of fiscal revenue, property
taxation will tend to be too low in high-homeownership communities, while other local
taxes and fees will tend to be too high. The latter effect could unfold adverse repercussions
on the access to local public and quasi-public goods. Our results finally have practical
implications for local policy makers in providing a possibility to judge their actual tax
multiplier choices against an empirical benchmark.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the cur-
rent state of research concerning the political economy of property taxation and spatial
property tax dependence, including a discussion of the key concepts of home-voting, tax
illusion and tax mimicking. Section 3 links this review to a yardstick competition model
of local property taxation, which serves to derive the key hypotheses we test. Section 4
introduces the data set and discusses our identification strategy. Section 5 presents the
empirical results, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Home-Voting, Renting and Spatial Property Tax
Interaction
The concept of utility-maximizing residents ultimately determining residential property
tax rates goes back to as early as Tiebout (1956). Tiebout’s seminal “voting with your
feet model” relied on fully mobile consumers and dispensed with any political behavior.
Fischel (2001) was the first to articulate the idea that homeowners who are voters (“home-
voters”) are special with respect to their interests towards desired local levels of public
spending and property taxes, and that they articulate these interests in local political
processes. According to this “home-voter hypothesis”, the level of property taxation and
other public financing decisions are ultimately driven by the desire of resident homeowners
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to maximize the values of their houses. Fischel’s hypothesis has been tested in the context
of numerous local public referenda, usually with corroborating results (see, e.g., Dehring,
Depken II, and Ward, 2008; Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2015).
Rather than focusing solely on homeowners, subsequent work has put stronger focus
on the tastes and behavior of homeowners and renters. Particularly for the U.S., research
suggests that the larger the share of households renting their homes in a jurisdiction,
the higher the tendency of the local government to spend extensively on public services,
the so-called “renter effect”. Oates (2005) focuses on the potential mechanisms that lead
renters to drive up local public expenditures in a jurisdiction. Consistent with early
research by Roche (1986), he finds that the positive association between rental share and
public spending is due to renters’ perception of public services being “not so costly”,
rather their higher demand for such services compared to homeowners. Fiscal illusion is
thus a likely source of the renter effect. In the presence of a renter effect, any empirical
model explaining property tax rate choice through spatial variation in homeownership
must carefully control for the local level of public expenditure.
More recently, Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen (2015) discuss fiscal illusion as a possi-
ble explanation for the higher willingness of renters to support an increase in local property
taxes to expand funding for public services. Using micro-level data of registered voters
in California, they find that compared to renters, homeowners are 10-15% less likely to
be in favor of a property tax rather than a sales tax increase. Their estimation strategy
controls for individual preferences towards public spending. Contradictory to the fiscal
illusion hypothesis, their result is not driven by the voting behavior of renters: while
renters are indifferent to whether a property tax or sales tax increase is used to finance
additional spending, it is the homeowners who strongly oppose a property tax increase
relative to a sales tax increase. Importantly, the strong aversion against property tax
increases is not associated with the relative tax burden faced by this group of residents.
As a potential explanation for this finding, Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen (2015) refer to
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the more salient nature of property taxes for homeowners.
Cabral and Hoxby (2016) exploit variation in property tax escrow across locations in
the U.S. in order to investigate in more detail to what extent the salience of the property
tax for homeowners affects its level and acceptance. To study the effect of salience, they
make use of the fact that about half of U.S. homeowners with mortgages pay their prop-
erty taxes through tax escrow, a payment method that converts the usually highly visible
property tax into an indirect, difficult-to-compute payment that is collected through au-
tomatic methods. Variation in the use of tax escrow generates variation in property tax
salience over different jurisdictions and time that can be considered as random. Their
findings indicate that areas where property taxes are less salient witness higher tax rates
and lower likelihoods of tax revolts, which they use as an indication of tax popularity.
Existing studies on the policital economy of property taxation in the presence of
home-voting and differences in tax salience between owners and renters fail to account
for spatial dependence emanating from local governments’ interactions in tax rate choice.
There is ample evidence that local property tax rates are at least partially driven by
the observable choices of neighboring governments. The corresponding literature will be
briefly reviewed in the following.
Among the first to use spatial econometric methods to investigate strategic property
tax interaction are Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). Spatial interaction is motivated in
their paper by public tax competition in the presence of footloose, heterogeneous con-
sumers and sorting. In order to trace out the property tax reaction function of the
representative community, Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) estimate a spatial autoregres-
sive model with data covering a sample of cities in the Boston metropolitan area. They
find significant spatial lag parameters from 0.16 to 0.70, depending on the form of the
spatial weighting matrix.6 While these results are generally in line with tax competi-
tion, Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) note correctly that their findings are observationally
6Obviously, a precise estimation is strongly limited by the small sample size that is used in that paper.
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equivalent with the yardstick competition framework of Besley and Case (1995). In this
framework, resident voters are immobile and have homogeneous preferences but use in-
formation about tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions to judge whether their own local
government is inefficient and deserves to be voted out of office.7
Following the work of Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), an increasing number of
papers has examined spatial dependence in local property tax rates for different countries.
These papers usually estimate spatial dependence parameters of 0.4-0.6, equivalent with
ten percentage point higher average property tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions leading
to a 4-6 points higher tax rate in the jurisdiction considered (without accounting for any
feedback effects). A key objective has been to better discriminate among tax and yardstick
competition as possible sources of such dependence.
Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli (2003) show that local property tax rates are pos-
itively spatially autocorrelated among adjacent jurisdictions in Italy when the mayors
run for reelection, while this correlation is absent either when mayors face a term limit
or when backed by an overwhelming majority in the local council. This result clearly
supports yardstick competition and tax mimicking as the relevant mechanism. Analyzing
property tax choice interaction by Dutch municipalities, Allers and Elhorst (2005) corrob-
orate this view, finding that interaction in property tax rates is less pronounced among
municipalities governed by coalitions backed by large majorities. Fiva and Rattsø (2007)
apply a spatial probit model to test whether the decision to have the residential property
tax in local communities in Norway depends on the observable past decisions of adjacent
localities. Their results also point towards yardstick competition as best predictor of
existing geographic patterns in local property tax rates.
Two more recent studies deserve to be mentioned. Dubois and Paty (2010) use a
panel of 104 local communities from 1989-2001 in order to test housing tax setting in
France. They extend the analysis of yardstick competition by the impact of tax choices
7Self-interested governments choose tax rates knowing that residents make such comparisons and strategic
interaction among jurisdictions arises just as in a tax competition model.
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in locations which are not only geographically close but comparable in socioeconomic
structure. Their results suggest that voters sanction incumbents when their own local
housing tax is high relative to geographic neighbors, and reward them when cities similar
in socioeconomic structure have high local taxes. Delgado, Lago-Penas, and Mayor (2011)
use a large sample of 2,713 municipalities in Spain and find evidence of property tax mim-
icking with a spatial lag parameter of slightly over 0.4. Overall, the accumulated evidence
strongly points towards the existence of systematic spatial dependence in property tax
choices and yardstick competition as the main driver of this dependence.8
3 A Simple Yardstick Competition Model
Yardstick competition in tax rates (Besley and Case, 1995) is based on informational
externalities between jurisdictions. Voters make comparisons between jurisdictions to
overcome the political agency problem of asymmetric information about the true cost of
providing local public services and the quality of local policymakers. This forces incum-
bent governments into yardstick competition, in which they have to account for other
(neighboring) local governments’ tax choices. We incorporate the political economy of
homeowning versus renting into this framework by allowing for heterogeneity in voters’
information sets and motivation to vote against high property taxes.
In order to finance public services, local governments within an economy of M
autonomous but interdependent jurisdictions can tax property at a rate τm per unit of local
property tax base. The cost of providing public services per unit of tax base, φm, is random
8Some recent papers have advocated a quasi-experimental research design to identify strategic interaction
in property tax setting. This line of research has argued that reduced-form spatial interaction models
rely on comparatively strong assumptions that lead towards a tendency to overestimate the true amount
of interaction. Lyytika¨inen (2012) uses a reform of the statutory lower limits to property tax rates in
Finland as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the response of municipalities to tax rates in
neighboring communities. He finds no evidence of systematic interdependencies in property tax rates.
Baskaran (2014) exploits a reform of the fiscal equalization scheme in the German state of North Rhine-
Westphalia, which exogenously caused local municipalities to increase their property and business tax
rates, to identify tax mimicking by local governments in the neighboring state of Lower Saxony. While
traditional spatial lag regressions suggest immediate strategic interactions, a difference-in-difference
analysis also points towards insignificant interaction in tax rates.
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and specific to each municipality. This cost is known to local governments but unobserved
by residents. The socially optimal level of spending per unit of tax base corresponding
to local cost is g∗m. Different from property tax rates, the local cost of providing public
services cannot be controlled by policy makers. It is reasonable to assume that the local
cost varies with exogenous jurisdictional characteristics, such as population size and socio-
demographic composition (e.g., the proportion of residents seeking unemployment benefits
or subsidies), as well as with revenues from other taxes and transfers from superordinate
layers of federal government (Revelli, 2005). Governments have to tax property more
heavily if they face higher unit costs, such that in equilibrium it holds τm = τ (φm) with
dτm
dφm
> 0. This leads to our first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 – Local Public Financing through Property Taxes: Higher
spending needs and more constrained fiscal conditions in a jurisdiction go along with higher
local property tax multipliers.
Residents obtain utility from public services consumption and earn disutility from
being taxed. There can be two types of government: “good” governments provide public
services at true cost, whereas “bad” governments engage in rent-seeking by increasing
property taxes over costs and impropriating the surplus, sm = τm − φm. Resident vot-
ers can appraise incumbents’ and discriminate “good” from “bad” governments only by
comparing the property tax rate and public services in their own jurisdiction with observ-
able neighboring jurisdictions’ average tax rates and services, τ−m and g−m. Voters care
about minimizing expected future taxes using present taxes and services to update their
beliefs that the incumbent is good using Bayes’ rule. With given observables, they vote
“bad” incumbents out of office with probability pm = p(τm, τ−m, gm, g−m).
9 Information
about public policies in neighboring municipalities thus help imperfectly informed voters
to learn about the own local governments’ public financing efficiency. Since incumbent
9Both voters and the property tax base are considered to be immobile between jurisdictions, e.g., because
of prohibitive transaction costs of moving house. This shuts down the voting-with-your-feet channel that
is central to the class of tax competition models in the spirit of Tiebout (1956).
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governments aim at being reelected, they are forced to take neighboring jurisdictions’ poli-
cies into account in their own tax rate choices. Besley and Case (1995) demonstrate that
in equilibrium, a situation emerges where adjacent local jurisdictions strategically mimic
each others’ property tax rate choices, known as yardstick competition: τm = τ (φm, τ−m)
with dτm
dφm
, dτm
dτ−m
> 0. This leads to our second testable hypothesis:10
Hypothesis 2 – Spatial Tax Mimicking: Local governments mimic each other
in setting property tax multipliers: higher multipliers in neighboring jurisdictions go along
with higher multipliers in the own municipality, and vice versa.
Information asymmetry between local councils and voters about the true costs of
local public services provision lies at the heart of the yardstick competition framework.
In the homeowner-renter context, it is plausible to keep this core assumption and assume
that such costs are fully known to the local councils but generally not observable by
both homeowners and renters. The research reviewed in the previous chapter yet clearly
suggests that it is reasonable to allow for heterogeneity with regard to the degree of in-
formation and behavior of these two different groups of residents, as homeowners have
stronger incentives to closely monitor local governments’ property tax choices than renters
and the tax is generally more salient to them. This is expected to cause a greater willing-
ness among homeowners to sanction bad governments in the presence of inefficiently high
taxes. In this case, jurisdictional homeownership rates enter the probability-of-reelection
function for bad governments11 as additional arguments. To see this, note that the utility
of bad governments in the yardstick competition game, Vm, depends on the surplus they
can appropriate from raising taxes over costs in the current period and, in case they get
10Revelli (2005) points out that when the main interest is on identifying spatial interaction, it is necessary
to look for further restrictions that help to discriminate yardstick competition from spatially autocor-
related shocks to local public finances. Since our main focus is on the effect of homeownership on tax
multipliers, we do not look for such further restrictions, but instead carefully interpret any significant
spatial dependence in multipliers as the absence of evidence against yardstick competition.
11See Besley and Case (1995) for in-depth discussions of the probability-of-reelection function.
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reelected, subsequent periods:
Vm = maxsm{vm (sm) + pmV t+1m } (1)
with marginal utility dvm
dsm
> 0 and marginal probability of reelection dpm
dsm
< 0. Equation
(1) highlights the fundamental trade-off between higher utility from higher surpluses in
the present period against the lower probability of being reelected for the subsequent
period if being unmasked of being “bad”.
Now assume that homeowners, present in local populations with varying and exoge-
nous shares of pim, always only reelect incumbents if they can expect them to be good,
given the observable property tax setting decisions in their own jurisdiction relative to
neighboring municipalities. Renters, present in local populations with shares of 1 − pim,
can be of two different types: an exogenous fraction of γ (homogeneous among municipal-
ities) is “careless” about the relative level of property taxes and reelects incumbents with
an exogenous probability of pexγ , whereas a fraction of 1− γ is “informed” and follows the
same probabilistic voting behavior as homeowners do. We lend to the notation of Revelli
(2005) in writing the probability-of-reelection function among homeowners in this case as
pownersm = p
(
τm, τ−m, gm, g−m
)
(2)
and among renters as
prentersm = γp
ex
γ + (1− γ) p
(
τm, τ−m, gm, g−m
)
. (3)
The total probability-of-reelection function for municipality m becomes
pm = (1− γ + pimγ) p
(
τm, τ−m, gm, g−m
)
+ (γ − pimγ) pexγ , (4)
which is a weighted average of the reelection probabilities among homeowners and renters.
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For pexγ > p(·), it holds that dpmdpim < 0, i.e. the reelection probability always decreases with
higher local shares of homeowners irrespective of the level of γ.12 If local governments
maximize (1) with respect to sm and incumbents’ probability of being reelected follows
(4), the emerging tax reaction function includes both the local share of homeowners and
the share of homeowners in neighboring jurisdictions as arguments:
τm = τ
(
φm, pim, τ−m, gm, g−m, pi−m
)
. (5)
Through decreasing the reelection probability in the case of being unmasked of “bad”
behavior, a higher local homeownership rate unanimously decreases the property tax rate
in the own municipality. This leads us to our third and key testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 – Homeowner Effect: Local property tax multipliers decrease with
an increasing share of owner-occupied dwellings in a municipality.
Heterogeneity with regard to voting behavior between owners and renters in the
context of local property taxation leads to another interesting implication: as property tax
rates are complements in the yardstick competition game, the higher local governments set
their own tax multipliers relative to neighbors, the higher the probability that homeowners
(and informed renters) vote them out of office. Yardstick competition and tax mimicking
among jurisdictions should therefore be particularly intense when homeownership rates
in the region are generally higher than elsewhere, i.e. when there are many “watchdogs”
in the populations of competing jurisdictions. This leads to a fourth and final testable
hypothesis which supplements our key hypothesis on the homeowner effect:
Hypothesis 3∗ – Regional Homeownership and Tax Competition: The in-
tensity of spatial tax mimicking among local governments is stronger within regions of
high-homeownership municipalities.
12This condition implies that “careless” renters always reelect “bad” local governments with a higher
probability than homeowners and “informed” renters, independent of the local level of rent seeking. If
pexγ = p(·), the partition of local voters into homeowners and renters would have no effect on the overall
local probability of reelection of rent-seeking governments.
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4 Data and Estimation Methodology
4.1 Data
Property Tax Multipliers. Like in many other countries, the German property tax
is levied at the municipal level. The taxonomy of property taxation follows the same
principles country-wide. The annual tax burden for a property j of type k in a municipality
m can be calculated as follows:
TAXj,k,m = V AL
ass
j ·RATEk ·MULTm, (6)
where TAX denotes the tax payment, V ALass the property-specific assessed value, RATE
a property-type-specific tax rate and MULT the local tax multiplier.
Municipal autonomy in choosing the effective property tax rate is limited to setting
the local tax multiplier MULTm. The responsibility for setting this multiplier is with the
municipal councils. The property-specific assessed values (“Einheitswerte”) are fixed by
the local tax offices based on a methodology using 1964 house prices for West Germany
and 1935 prices for East Germany.13 The property-type-specific tax rates are ruled by
federal law and uniform across the country.14 The local tax multiplier is hence the only
component of the effective tax rate that can be directly influenced by local governments,
while all other components are exogenous.15
Local councils are generally allowed to alter the multiplier once in a calendar year.
Any change to the multiplier has to be disclosed to the public in the municipal register
(“Gemeindeblatt”). Public referenda about changes to the local property tax multiplier
13Due to the outdated price references, the assessed values are completely disconnected from current
market conditions. See Box 1 in the Appendix for further institutional details on assessed values.
14The tax rate is 2.6 for single-family houses until the first 38.356,89 euros of assessed value and 3.5
thereafter, 3.1 for two-family houses and 3.5 for all other non-agricultural properties.
15It could be argued that local governments can influence the size of the tax base in the long run by
allowing more housing construction. However, new construction is typically very small compared to
the existing stock due to the extreme durability of housing. The property tax base is thus practically
fixed for periods far longer than a major’s typical period of power.
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are not possible. Households can only avoid paying higher property taxes by voting for
another party in response to tax rises or by discussing with the elected members of the
local council, which is voted every five or six years depending on state law.
Data on local property tax multipliers for the year of 2011 is obtained from Local
Property Tax Statistics. We restrict our sample to 8,036 Western German municipalities
without the two city states of Hamburg and Bremen.16 As illustrated by Figure 1, local
tax multipliers vary widely across municipalities. Some local governments set the tax
multiplier to zero, which is equivalent to exempting housing from taxation. The maximum
multiplier is 800 percent, 2.4 times the sample mean of 333 percent. Residing in even fairly
adjacent locations can lead to substantial differences in annual tax burdens: moving ten
kilometers from Dierfeld, a small municipality in Rhineland-Palatinate with the highest
multiplier in the sample, to the adjacent municipality of Diefenbach could save a household
owning a typical single-family home with an assessed value of 80,000 euros17 a property
tax payment of 1,500 euros annually. This annual saving would translate into several ten
thousands of euros over the typical duration of a household in a home.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Homeownership Rates. Data on municipality-level homeownership rates is ob-
tained from the 2011 German Census. The Census encompassed a complete inventory
of residential buildings and their housing units, containing detailed information on the
type of owner (private individual, owners’ association, housing company, cooperative or
other), current use (owner-occupied, rented out or vacant) and characteristics of each
housing unit. We remove seasonal and recreational dwellings as well as dwellings used by
diplomats and foreign armed forces. We subsequently compute the percentage shares of
owner-occupied, rental and vacant housing units at the municipal level.
16Due to data limitations for important fiscal variables, such as debt or public spending, it was not
possible to include Eastern German municipalities in the sample.
17Due to their considerable age, the assessed values used to compute the individual tax burden are much
lower than contemporaneous market values, which strongly reduces the effective property tax rate.
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Figure 2 illustrates the geographical distribution of municipal homeownership rates.
The unweighted mean share of homeowners at the municipality level is 67 percent, with
an enormous range spanning from 20 to 100 percent. Due to a very large number of small
jurisdictions with high homeownership rates, the sample mean is considerably higher
than the population-weighted Western German homeownership rate of 48 percent. High-
homeownership jurisdictions are particularly clustered in rural regions in the northwest,
in Bavaria and southwestern Germany. Low-homeownership municipalities are primarily
concentrated in major metropolitan areas and post-industrial regions.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 3 shows Kernel estimates of the probability mass functions of local property
tax multipliers among “low” (below-median) and “high” (above-median) homeownership
rate municipalities. The estimated density functions are identifiably different, indicating
a concentration of probability mass at average multipliers among high homeownership
locations in comparison to low homeownership ones, with considerable less concentration
of probability mass towards the right end of the multiplier scale.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Fiscal Conditions. Local property tax rates critically depend on local fiscal
conditions. If homeowners have different tastes with respect to levels of public spending
or debt, these conditions in turn systematically differ with respect to the local share of
homeownership (Oates, 2005). In order to account for the possibly confounding role of
fiscal circumstances, we include 2010 levels of local public spending and municipal debt
(at the superordinate district level) per capita, as well as per capita revenues from local
business tax and vertical transfers of federal income and sales tax for the same year.18
18In 2010, the entity of municipalities received 15% of the county-wide income tax and 2.2% of the
country-wide sales tax revenue within the German vertical fiscal equalization scheme. The revenues
were distributed to individual municipalities according to allocation formulae which account for, among
other factors, local income tax and business tax revenue.
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We obtain this data from the Federal Statistical Office. We additionally control for the
size of the local property tax base per capita, which can be considered exogenous to local
governments because assessed values are completely uncoupled from market values and
local housing stocks are extremely durable (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
Further Controls. As socioeconomic controls, we include population size, squared
population size, population density and multiple indicators of socioeconomic structure
(2009 taxable income per capita, share of unemployed persons, share of population aged
10 years or younger and population aged 70 years or older). In order to account for
heterogeneous political preferences as another potentially confounding variable, we also
include local shares of valid votes for the three main German left-oriented parties19 in
the 2009 Federal elections.20 We obtain all data from the Federal Statistical Office. We
additionally include a set of dummy variables flagging municipalities with state or country
borders and cities with 100,000 inhabitants or more. We finally include a set of dummy
variables reflecting the state in which a certain municipality is located.
Table 1 shows key descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis. In addi-
tion to characteristic values of each variable’s univariate distribution, we report Moran’s
I as a common measure of global spatial autocorrelation.21 According to Moran’s I,
both local property tax multipliers and homeownership rates display considerable spatial
dependence, as do almost all covariates.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
19As left-oriented parties we include the Social Democratic Party (“Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands”, SPD), the Green Party (“Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen”) and the Socialist Party (“Die Linke”).
20In the 2009 German Bundestag Election, every voter had two votes: one to directly elect a local
candidate (who can but must not necessarily be associated with a party) and a second vote to elect a
party for seats in the German Bundestag. We use only the party-related second votes.
21Moran’s I values are computed using the row-standardized 10-nearest-neighbor spatial weight matrix.
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4.2 Estimation Strategy
We test our hypotheses within a spatial framework of property tax rate choice. We link
local property tax multipliers to local homeownership rates, neighboring municipalities’
multipliers and controls in a spatial autoregressive model allowing for heteroskedastic
disturbances:
τ = λWτ + βHOR +XΨ +  with  ∼ (0, σ2mIN) . (7)
The dependent variable τ is an N × 1-vector of municipal property tax multipliers in
2011, measured in percent. The tax multiplier in each municipality is not influenced by
the characteristics of this jurisdiction alone, but also by a weighted average of property
tax multipliers in adjacent localities. The strength of this dependence is governed by the
N -dimensional spatial weighting matrix WN and the size of the spatial lag parameter λ.
HOR is an N × 1-vector of municipal homeownership rates; X is an N × k+ 1-matrix of
fiscal and non-fiscal control variables, while β and Ψ pick up (vectors of) coefficients.
Spatial Weighting Matrix. The choice set to specify a spatial weighting matrix
ranges from different forms of geographical contiguity to distance-based connectivity. In
the contiguity case, the spatial weights are typically based on the common border crite-
rion, which allocates equal weights to all geographical neighbors. In the distance case,
the spatial weights can be based on geographic and/or socioeconomic distance (Fingleton
and Le Gallo, 2008; Dubois and Paty, 2010) and decrease exponentially in size at an
exogenously defined rate of distance decay. We base the choice of spatial weights on our
theoretical model and refer to the concepts of contiguity and geographic distance rather
than socioeconomic distance: first, geographic neighbors are most likely to experience
similar shocks and therefore provide the most useful information on the size of innovation
for neighboring jurisdictions’ voters (Besley and Case, 1995). Second, resident voters can
most probably compare their own jurisdiction with others belonging to the same local me-
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dia market.22 Our baseline matrix is a row-standardized, binary nearest-neighbor matrix
that links all municipalities to their 10 closest neighbors. We check whether our results
are sensitive to replacing this baseline matrix with a row-standardized inverse-physical-
distance matrix with a 50 kilometer-cutoff band as well as with less sparse nearest-neighbor
matrices with 20 and 30 neighbors, respectively.23
Unobserved Heterogeneity. A concern about estimating the spatial autoregres-
sive model of Equation (7) with cross-sectional data is unobserved local heterogeneity.
Accounting extensively for observables cannot rule out that fixed effects in local tax mul-
tipliers that are correlated with local homeownership remain uncontrolled. Unfortunately,
we lack historical data on all relevant variables at this fine-grained spatial level that would
allow us to set up a panel data set. We instead resort to including spatial lags in the
covariates along with the ordinary spatial lag in the property tax multiplier. The result-
ing spatial Durbin model (SDM)24 is able to capture unobserved heterogeneity when the
unobserved factors are spatially correlated (LeSage and Pace, 2010; Elhorst, 2010).25
Endogeneity. Our identification strategy faces a potential endogeneity issue for
the homeownership rate: if unobserved shocks to local property tax multipliers provide
homeowners with an incentive to migrate to lower-tax locations, this decreases an area’s
homeownership and increases its tax rate in the long run. Such reverse causality would
generate correlation between homeownership rates and the disturbances. Drukker, Egger,
22The use of socioeconomic indicators for the definition of weights would furthermore require to ensure
their strict exogeneity, unless their endogeneity is explicitly considered in the model specification.
23Revelli (2005) argues that if unobserved shocks hit adjacent jurisdictions similarly, there may still
remain spatial autocorrelation in the disturbance process of a spatial lag model of tax rate choice. To
rule out this possibility, we test the regressions residuals of all spatial models for remaining spatial
dependence using Moran’s I. We additionally estimate a so-called mixed-regressive spatial model,
which contains both a spatial lag in the dependent variable and a spatially autocorrelated error term.
The mixed-regressive spatial model can be written as: τ = λWτ + βHOR + XΨ +  with  = ρWξ,
ξ ∼ (0, σ2i IN). The results for this model, as well as further alternative specifications of the spatial lag
model, are reported in Table IntA.1 in the Internet Appendix.
24The spatial Durbin model can be written as: τ = λWτ + βHOR + γWHOR +XΨ +WXΩ +  with
 ∼ (0, σ2mIN).
25Only in the very special case that the dependent variable does not exhibit spatial dependence and there
are no spatially dependent omitted variables correlated with the included covariates, OLS and SDMs
will yield very similar parameter estimates.
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and Prucha (2013) recently propose a generalized method-of-moments and instrumental
variable estimation strategy for spatial autoregressive models with additional endogenous
regressors, extending earlier work by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999).26 We use their
estimation strategy and consider variables as instruments that are strongly correlated
with 2011 local homeownership rates but expectedly independent of unobserved shocks
to local tax multipliers. Based on extensive data search and processing, we resort to two
previously untapped historical measures: the share of local housing destroyed or severely
damaged by allied warfare during the Second World War and historical local proportions
of owner-occupied dwellings directly after the war.27 We obtain data on both variables
at the level of historical districts from a complete housing inventory compiled in the 1950
West German Housing Census.28 We construct municipality-level data for both variables
matching the contemporaneous boundaries of all Western German municipalities to the
boundaries of historical districts using historical maps and GIS.
Both war-related housing damages and directly after-war homeownership rates are
expected to be valid instruments, influencing contemporaneous local property tax mul-
tipliers only through the channel of having long-lasting effects on our causal variable of
interest, contemporaneous homeownership. Allied warfare can be viewed as a natural
experiment that changed German local homeownership rates markedly within the first
two decades after the war (Wolf and Caruana-Galicia, 2015). As described in detail by
Voigtla¨nder (2009), war-induced damages to local housing stocks led to large-scale, pub-
licly subsidized provision of rental housing in affected areas, especially from the year of
1950 onwards.29 Importantly, this public funding came entirely from the superordinate
26Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) propose using the linearly independent columns of X, WX and W qX
as instruments to solve the endogeneity problem between Y and WY .
27We experimented with local voter participation in the 2009 Bundestag elections as an additional in-
strument. Voter parcicipation is strongly (positively) correlated with homeownership, but probably not
exogeneous to local property tax rates in equilibrium due to sorting effects.
28The boundaries of 1950 districts usually comprise dozens of contemporaneous municipalities.
29On Western German territory, about 2.25 million dwellings were destroyed, reducing the housing stock
by nearly 20 percent in comparison to prewar levels. A further 2-2.5 million dwellings were damaged.
Estimates suggest that in 1950, there was still a shortage of more than 4.5 million homes. This shortage
was heavily reduced to an estimated shortfall of 660,000 dwellings in 1962, see Voigtla¨nder (2009).
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state level. Municipal governments did not have to increase property taxation in order to
finance rental housing provision.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the distribution of war-related housing damage rates in
1950 at the level of historical districts. War damages mainly followed a west-east pat-
tern which mimicked the direction of entry of Allied forces into Germany. High damage
rates focused on towns and cities but extended to both urban and rural regions. Panel B
illustrates historical homeownership rates at the district level. The first-stage regression
reveals that municipal homeownership rates today are still significantly lower in munici-
palities positioned in historical districts which suffered more war-related housing damages
and had lower 1950 homeownership rates.30
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation of Tax Multiplier Choice Model
Table 2 presents regression results from estimating different versions of Equation (7). To
allow assessing the influence of accounting for spatial dependence and endogeneity on the
results, the first column shows results for a non-spatial, non-instrumental variable version
estimated by OLS. The subsequent columns show results for two alternative specifica-
tions of the spatial autoregressive model: the first specification is based on the baseline
10-nearest-neighbor contiguity matrix, while the second one is based on inverse physical
distances between municipality centroids with a cutoff band of 50 kilometers.31 The fourth
and fifth columns show estimation results for two extended spatial versions of the model:
first, a spatial Durbin model that includes spatially lagged covariates along with the spa-
tially lagged tax multiplier, and second, a spatial autoregressive model which treats local
30Regression results for the first stage are reported in Table IntA.2 in the Internet Appendix.
31For results based on 20- and 30-nearest-neighbors, see Table IntA.1 in the Internet Appendix.
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homeownership as endogenous, using war-related housing damages and homeownership
rates at the historical district level as instruments. Both extended versions are estimated
using the baseline 10-nearest-neighbor matrix.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
All models are generally successful in explaining the variation in municipal property
tax multipliers. In line with our main hypothesis, the local homeownership rate carries the
expected negative sign and is throughout significant at the five percent level or better.32
The estimated coefficients for local homeownership turn out to be highly robust across
the different specifications in terms of statistical and economic significance, as do the
coefficients for fiscal and non-fiscal controls.
As indicated by the significant spatial parameters and large values of Moran’s I for
the OLS disturbances, OLS clearly fails to account for the spatial interaction processes
governing property tax choice. Depending on the exact specification, the spatial lag
parameter lies between 0.62 and 0.85 and is always strongly significant. These results do
not hinge upon the concrete definition of the spatial weighting matrix: replacing nearest
neighbors by inverse distance reduces the goodness of fit while only slightly changing the
estimated coefficients for homeownership and the covariates.33 Including spatially lagged
covariates in the model remarkably improves fit but leaves most coefficients and also the
spatial dependence parameter almost unchanged vis-a`-vis the spatial lag model.
Almost all covariates capturing local fiscal conditions tend to be highly significant
and carry plausible signs. Higher spending and debt levels per capita, reflecting higher
financing needs, are associated with higher property tax multipliers. Higher local busi-
ness tax revenues and vertical tax transfers per capita relax local governments’ budget
32We experimentally ran the same regressions with the percentage multiplier change between 2001-2011
as dependent variable instead of the level of multipliers. The local homeownership rate pertains its
significantly negative effect on multipliers in this setting.
33Increasing the number of neighbors from 10 to 20 or 30 also yields larger dependence parameters with
otherwise very similar results.
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constraints and go along with lower local property tax multipliers, ceteris paribus. The
size of the property tax base is found to be insignificant in the majority of specifications.
Concerning the role of socioeconomic structure and political tastes in municipal
property tax rate choice, the evidence is again in line with expectations, albeit some co-
efficients lack statistical significance. We find higher tax multipliers in larger and more
densely populated municipalities (with decreasing margins in population), more unem-
ployment, higher shares of elderly persons and more left-oriented political preferences.
Municipalities at state or federal borders tend to charge higher multipliers, whereas we
do not find any separate effect for localities with populations of 100,000 or more.34
The coefficients estimated on our main variable of interest are always statistically
significant and negative, ranging between -0.199 in the OLS specification to -0.284 for the
first-round (or direct) effect in the spatial IV specification. While caution is warranted
for comparisons of coefficients estimated in linear non-spatial versus simultaneous spatial
models, the evidence clearly shows that higher shares of homeowners in local populations
are indeed associated with systematically lower property tax levels. This key result re-
mains unchanged when an instrumental variable estimation is carried out based on teasing
out exogenous variation in the contemporaneous homeownership rate based on variation
in war-related housing damages and long-lagged homeownership rates at the superordi-
nate historical district level. This indicates that the correlation that we observe in the
data indeed lends itself to a causal interpretation.
Concerning economic significance, we first refer to the direct effect of a change in
the homeownership rate on the tax multiplier in a certain municipality. Shutting down
any indirect effects of tax changes emanating from multi-channel feedback playing out
through the system of spatially interdependent jurisdictions, a ten percentage point rise
34All specifications include the (unreported) full set of state dummies, which are highly significant in
every specification, indicating considerable differences in average property tax levels across states that
remain unexplained by the given covariates. This finding can be explained by the multi-tiered structure
of German public finances, which renders fiscal conditions very heterogeneous on state-level and makes
unconditional tax multiplier levels highly dependent on states.
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in the local homeownership would on average reduce the local property tax multiplier by
2-3 percentage points. For a typical single-family house worth 80,000 euros of assessed
value, this direct effect would be equivalent to a roughly one percent decrease in the
annual tax burden, evaluated at the sample mean multiplier of 340 points. While this is
a small economic effect at the level of the individual house, it is important to remember
that municipalities typically consist of several hundreds or even thousands of homes.
Due to the strong spatial dependence in municipal property tax multipliers, the es-
timated direct effect of a change in homeownership in some municipality does not capture
the total effect of this change on property tax multipliers. As adjacent jurisdictions react
to the resulting change in their neighboring municipality’s multiplier with altering their
own multiplier, so will do their neighbors, and so on. The steady-state equilibrium size
of these indirect effects depends on the size of the spatial dependence parameter and the
shape of the spatial weighting matrix.35 Following the “total effect to an observation”
viewpoint pioneered by LeSage and Page (2009), we calculate the average total impact
on the tax multiplier of a locality m from a global ten percentage point rise in local
homeownership shares across the entire sample.36 In the spatial autoregressive model
with 10 nearest neighbors, the average total effect is -5.6, more than twice as much as the
average direct effect of -2.1. Using the estimates from the 10-nearest-neighbors spatial
Durbin model, the total effect even amounts to -7.1.37 The resulting reduction in local
multipliers of 6-7 points would correspond to an annual loss of 120-140 million euros, or
one percent of total property tax revenue across all municipalities in the sample.
35See LeSage and Page (2009) for a formal exposition of average direct, indirect and total effects.
36The actual homeownership rate exceeded 90 percent in 111 communities in 2011 (1.4 percent of the
sample). The resulting error can be considered negligible.
37Compared to the direct effect, this is a disproportional increase vis-a`-vis the spatial autoregressive
model that can be explained by the larger estimate for the spatial lag parameter.
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5.2 Discriminating among Tax Incidence and Tax Salience as
Possible Channels
A natural question is whether the key result of a homeowner effect in local property taxes
is driven by differences in tax incidence or tax salience between homeowners and renters.
The design of the German property tax certainly renders salience higher for homeowners
than for renters. Regarding incidence, homeowners bear the full property tax burden
irrespective of local market conditions. For rental housing, incidence depends on the
relative local price elasticities of housing demand and supply. In “loose” markets where
demand for rental housing is considerably price elastic, the main portion of property tax
burdens in economic terms will remain with landlords. Renters are expected to bear
the main portion in “tight”, strong housing demand markets. Since every household is
expected to fully bear the tax, the partition of local housing into owner-occupied and
rental should play less a role for property taxes in the latter case. If local price elasticities
do not play a role, differences in salience are likely to be the main driver of our key result.
Discriminating among municipalities of high and low housing demand elasticities is a
challenging task. As a proxy of the relative local bargaining power between landlords and
tenants, we resort to the fraction of rental housing standing vacant in each municipality.38
It is plausible to assume that tenants’ bargaining power and price elasticity of demand
increase with higher local rental vacancy. This conjecture is strongly supported by a
regression of the cumulative local growth in apartment rents from 2004-2011 on the 2011
local rate of vacancy and state fixed effects: on average, each additional percentage point
of vacancy in local rental housing was associated with 8 percentage points less cumulative
rent growth at the level of districts.39
38For computation of the rental vacancy rate, we refer to the 2011 Census, taking into account only vacan-
cies in non-single family residential buildings excluding hostels and nursing homes, as well as dwellings
of diplomats and foreign armed forces. A housing unit is considered vacant if it was neither owner-
occupied nor rented out, excluding units that were temporarily not inhabited due to modernization or
renovation.
39Since data on rents is only available at the district level, we use data at this spatial scale instead of
municipalities. See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a scatterplot of local rent growth and vacancy rates.
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In order to test the proposition of a deviating homeowner effect, we interact local
homeownership rates with two mutually exclusive dummy variables, flagging municipal-
ities in the highest quartile of the rental vacancy distribution (“loose areas”, high va-
cancy=1 and 0 otherwise) and the lower three quartiles of the same distribution (“tight
areas”, low vacancy=1 and 0 otherwise). Since the distribution of rental vacancies is
strongly right-skewed, we conservatively split the sample at the 75th percentile rather
than the median. This ensures we only have true excess-housing jurisdictions in the
high-vacancy group.40
If differences in tax incidence drive our main result, we would expect homeown-
ership rates to depress property tax multipliers less strongly in jurisdictions with low
rental vacancies (low price elasticity of housing demand). However, Table 3 shows that
the homeownership coefficients for the two subsamples of high- vs. low-vacancy munici-
palities are always very close to one another, regardless of the specification considered.41
In fact, the null hypothesis that the two coefficients be equal can never be rejected at
common significance levels. Our key result thus holds regardlessly of the actual incidence
of property taxes, which supports the view that a higher salience of the property tax for
homeowners is likely to be the decisive mechanism that is driving our key result.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
5.3 Differences in Intensity of Property Tax Mimicking between
High- and Low-Homeownership Regions
If home-voters act as “watchdogs” over the efficiency of property taxation by local incum-
bents, not only are property tax rates influenced by the level of homeownership in each
40See Figure A.2 in the Appendix for the empirical frequency distribution of local rental vacancy rates.
The 75th percentile is 8 percent of vacancy, which already signals a considerably slack housing market.
The median is 5.6 percent of vacancy, a still fairly moderate rate. Mean homeownership rates in the
two groups of high and low rental vacancies are similar (66 vs. 72 percent).
41Full regression results for the local housing vacancy rate split are reported in Table IntA.3 in the
Internet Appendix.
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municipality, but the intensity of spatial interaction in local governments’ tax rate choices
is expected to be larger within regions featuring high homeownership rates in general.
In order to test this proposition empirically, we split our sample into two subsamples
reflecting different levels of regional homeownership rates. We first cluster the whole
sample of municipalities into the 72 official Western German planning regions, which are
delineated based on commuting patterns and can be interpreted as regional labor markets
(Lerbs and Oberst, 2014). We then compute the unweighted average homeownership rates
of municipalities belonging to each region and finally group municipality-regions according
to the average rate. Since the planning regions differ in size and comprise different numbers
of municipalities, this procedure is not equivalent to just splitting the sample at the
median homeownership rate. In contrast, our procedure ensures that jurisdictions within
functional regions are grouped together instead of jurisdictions spread all over the country.
The sample of municipalities in high-homeownership regions consists of 4,171 ju-
risdictions, while in low-homeownership regions, we arrive at a number of 3,865. The
mean local homeownership rate is 72.8 percent in the “high” sample versus 62.8 percent
in the “low” sample.42 We construct different spatial weighting matrices individually
for the two subsamples using the same definitions of geographical adjacency as before
and estimate the familiar spatial models. The results are shown in Table 4. Our results
are perfectly in line with the theoretical prediction: for each specification, the estimated
spatial dependence in property tax multipliers is considerably larger within the group of
high-homeownership regions.43 The absolute difference is largest for the spatial lag model
estimated using the inverse distance matrix, where the estimated spatial lag parameter is
0.97 for the high-homeownership subsample and 0.65 for the low-homeownership subsam-
ple. We hence conclude that in addition to a significant effect of more homeownership
42With 62.8 percent, the mean local homeownership rate in the “low” sample is still considerably high.
In this sense, the split can be considered very conservative. The underlying reason is that aggregate
homeownership rates at the level of planning regions are relatively homogeneous.
43Full regression results for the split regressions for high- versus low-homeownership regions are reported
in Tables IntA.4 and IntA.5 in the Internet Appendix.
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within a particular municipality, higher homeownership rates in the region tend to be
associated with stronger property tax mimicking by local governments in that region.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
6 Conclusion
In efficient property markets, contract arrangements governing the partition of property
rights in local housing do not make any difference to how strongly housing is taxed. A
growing body of evidence suggests, however, that homeowners oppose property taxation
much more than renters. Homeowners have strong economic incentives to shield their
housing wealth against taxation, as they bear the full burden of the property tax inde-
pendent of local market conditions. They typically also face a stronger tax salience than
renters. This makes a case for the political economy of property taxation.
Based on data for over 8,000 German local jurisdictions, this paper has presented
representative and large-scale empirical evidence in favor of an economically meaningful
home-voter effect in local property taxation: property is taxed less heavily in jurisdictions
with higher proportions of owner-occupied housing. Based on estimates derived from spa-
tial econometric models that account for spatial dependence in municipal tax multipliers
and endogeneity in homeownership, we are able to compute the average total effect from
a hypothetical change in homeownership rates on property tax revenue. We estimate
that local tax multipliers would on average be 6-7 points lower if the homeownership rate
was ten percentage points higher across all 8,036 municipalities in our sample. Such a
reduction in local multipliers would correspond to an annual 120-140 million euros or one
percent loss of total tax revenue. This effect withstands the inclusion of a battery of po-
tentially confounding factors, the consideration of spatial dependence and the correction
for bias arising from endogeneity of homeownership levels.
Interacting municipal homeownership rates with an indicator of rental housing de-
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mand elasticity — the local non-single family housing rate of vacancy — suggests that our
key result even holds in “tight” housing markets, i.e. even when tenants are expected to
bear very similar property tax burdens in economic terms as their fellow owner-occupying
neighbors. We interpret this as evidence that the home-voter effect originates from differ-
ences in salience of the property tax between owner-occupiers and renters rather than from
differences in tax incidence. This interpretation is in line with recent findings by Cabral
and Hoxby (2016) and Brunner, Ross, and Simonsen (2015) using U.S. data. We finally
show that spatial tax mimicking among jurisdictions is stronger within regions comprising
high-homeownership-rate municipalities, suggesting that governments not only set lower
local tax rates but also care more intensively about the tax choices of their neighbors
when homeowning residents force them to do so.
Our results have at least two important practical implications. First, they provide
local governments with evidence enabling them to benchmark their actual tax rate choices
against other structurally comparable local jurisdictions. Second, our finding of a home-
voter effect in property taxation indicates that actual property tax levels may not be
efficient in terms of overall social welfare: if homeowners successfully manage to oppose
high property tax rates, property taxation will tend to be systematically too low in home-
owner communities, whereas other local fees and taxes will tend to be too high. Such
second-round effects, while not investigated in this paper, potentially affect the equity of
local access to public and quasi-public goods. Examining the question of whether local
governments attempt to compensate lower property tax revenues resulting from higher
local political power of homeowners by charging higher fees and non-property taxes is a
fruitful avenue of future research.
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Appendix
Box 1: Further Institutional Details on Assessed Values Used in German
Property Taxation
Instead of current market values, the German property tax is based on historical so-called
assessed values (“Einheitswerte”). Assessed values for all taxable property were de-
termined for the last time in 1964 in former West Germany and 1935 in former East
Germany. The legislator’s original intention was to reassess all taxable property every
six years. This intention was coded in §21(1) of the German Valuation Law (“Bewer-
tungsgesetz”), but the law was already suspended in 1965. Ever since, there has been no
legal foundation for updating the historical assessed values to current market values. For
property constructed after 1964 (West Germany) or 1935 (East Germany), respectively,
assessed values are computed based on comparison values that reflect the historical prices
of properties of the same type and similar size. Due to the very long time span since
taxable properties had been valuated, the assessed values are completely disconnected
from current market conditions. Over the last years, the German Federal Constitutional
Court has accepted multiple sues doubting the legitimacy of the current form of property
taxation. A reform of the German property tax, aiming at a new assessment of all taxable
property in 2022, is currently in preparation.
29
Figure A.1: Scatterplot of Non-Single Family Housing Vacancy and Rent Growth
This figure is based on data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial
Development and the 2011 Census and shows the empirical association between cumulative growth in net
apartment rents over 2004-2011 and the 2011 non-single family housing rate of vacancy in 325 Western
German districts.
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Figure A.2: Empirical Frequency Distribution of Non-Single Family Housing Vacancy
This figure is based on data from the 2011 Census and shows the empirical frequency distribution of the
non-single family housing rate of vacancy in 8,036 Western German municipalities in 2011.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. All values refer to the
year 2011 except when indicated otherwise. The reference level is 8,036 German municipalities.
Mean S.D. Min Max Moran’s I
Property tax multiplier (pct.) 333.6 51.7 0 800 0.495
Homeownership rate (pct.) 67.8 11.0 20.3 100.0 0.416
Municipal spending p.c. (euros, 2010) 1,175 1,468 -86 120,839 0.042
Municipal debt p.c. (euros, 2010) 1,372 860 104 8,068 0.838
Revenue business tax p.c. (euros, 2010) 224 387 -691 13,549 0.103
Income tax/VAT transfers p.c. (euros, 2010) 355 106 17 5,155 0.553
Property tax base p.c. (euros 1,000s) 28.8 11.4 0 362.8 0.334
Total population (1,000s) 7.2 28.9 0.0 1,348 0.160
Population density (inh./km2) 20.8 28.7 0.5 432.6 0.523
Taxable income p.c. (euros 1,000s, 2009) 15.1 3.8 4.1 100.6 0.467
Unemployed rate (pct.) 3.1 1.9 0 80.5 0.300
Persons aged 10 years or younger (pct.) 8.8 1.7 1.2 20.7 0.204
Persons aged 70 years or older (pct.) 14.8 3.2 5.2 36.8 0.310
Left-wing votes (pct., 2009) 38.6 10.3 10.0 75.9 0.686
State or country border (dummy) 0.15 - 0 1 -
Metro area (dummy) 0.01 - 0 1 -
State: Schleswig-Holstein (dummy) 0.13 - 0 1 -
State: Lower Saxony (dummy) 0.10 - 0 1 -
State: North Rhine-Westfalia (dummy) 0.05 - 0 1 -
State: Hesse (dummy) 0.05 - 0 1 -
State: Rhineland-Palatinate (dummy) 0.27 - 0 1 -
State: Baden-Wurttemberg (dummy) 0.14 - 0 1 -
State: Bavaria (dummy) 0.25 - 0 1 -
State: Saarland (dummy) 0.01 - 0 1 -
Variables used for IV/sample split
Share of war-damaged housing 1950 (pct.) 12.1 15.8 0.1 87.9 0.858
Homeownership rate 1950 (pct.) 56.3 15.9 8.3 83.5 0.717
Non-SFH vacancy rate (pct.) 6.3 4.8 0.0 100.0 0.112
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Table 2: OLS and Spatial Regression Results
This table shows regression results for five different specifications of the tax rate choice model. The
dependent variable is the 2011 municipal property tax multiplier in percent. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
SL indicates the spatial lag model, SD the spatial Durbin model, SL IV the spatial lag instrumental
variable model. N.N. denotes the number of nearest neighbors used in the definition of spatial weighting
matrices. Inv. D. denotes the inverse distance spatial weighting matrix.
OLS SL Model SL Model SD Model SL IV
(10 N.N.) (Inv. D.) (10 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Constant 317.296*** 130.555*** 59.813*** 116.938*** 82.114***
(8.863) (9.492) 12.030 (15.648) (18.822)
Pct. owner-occupied -0.199*** -0.214*** -0.203*** -0.253*** -0.284**
(0.068) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.144)
Spending p.c. 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Debt p.c. 0.003*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.003** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Business tax p.c. -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Income/VAT p.c. -0.082*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.057***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010)
Tax base p.c. (1,000s) -0.129* -0.025 -0.046 0.021 -0.071
(0.068) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.064)
Population (1,000s) 0.545*** 0.468*** 0.464*** 0.470*** 0.454***
(0.089) (0.092) (0.095) (0.088) (0.096)
Population2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.198*** 0.067**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029)
Income p.c. (1,000s) -0.332 -0.261 -0.214 -0.227 -0.224
(0.238) (0.236) (0.235) (0.251) (0.235)
Pct. unemployed 0.255 0.513** 0.461** 0.559** 0.378
(0.238) (0.238) (0.231) (0.264) (0.253)
Pct. < 10 years -0.013 0.216 0.197 0.153 0.172
(0.299) (0.256) (0.272) (0.254) (0.274)
Pct. > 70 years 0.552*** 0.421*** 0.417*** 0.363** 0.421***
(0.177) (0.151) (0.161) (0.159) (0.162)
Pct. left-wing votes 0.231*** 0.165*** 0.148*** 0.281*** 0.149***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.050) (0.065) (0.050)
D nation/state border 1.693 2.593** 2.637** 5.747*** 2.513**
(1.285) (1.165) (1.230) (1.565) (1.233)
D pop > 100,000 4.216 4.444 4.179 3.804 5.667
(13.467) (14.138) (14.369) (13.861) (14.409)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
λ - 0.615*** 0.850*** 0.668*** 0.800***
- (0.017) (0.027) (0.017) (0.034)
Spatially lagged cov. - - - Yes -
Wald test: lag. cov.=0 - - - 418.53*** -
# obs. 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036
R2 0.385 - - - -
Squared corr. coeff. - 0.359 0.301 0.398
Moran’s I residuals 0.317 0.014 0.045 -0.017 0.104
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Table 3: OLS and Spatial Regression Results for HOR-Vacancy Interaction Term
This table shows estimated interaction term coefficients for five different specifications of the tax rate
choice model including interaction terms between the local homeownership rate and a dummy variable
signaling high and low rental housing vacancy areas. The dependent variable is the municipal property
tax multiplier in percent. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. SL indicates the spatial lag model, SD the spatial
Durbin model, SL IV the spatial lag instrumental variable model. N.N. denotes the number of nearest
neighbors used in the definition of spatial weighting matrices. Inv. D. denotes the inverse distance spatial
weighting matrix.
OLS SL Model SL Model SD Model SL IV
(10 N.N.) (Inv. D.) (10 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Pct. owner-occupied * D(high vacancy) -0.195** -0.210*** -0.197*** -0.248*** -0.284**
(0.068) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.144)
Pct. owner-occupied * D(low vacancy) -0.208** -0.224*** -0.215*** -0.259*** -0.286*
(0.070) (0.063) (0.065) (0.069) (0.153)
p-value of test on equal coefficients 0.368 0.281 0.184 0.389 0.969
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Table 4: Spatial Dependence Parameters for Local Tax Multipliers within High- vs. Low-
Homeownership Regions
This table shows estimated spatial dependence parameters (λ) for four different specifications of the
spatial tax rate choice model using a sample split clustering together municipalities within regions of high
vs. low average homeownership rates. The dependent variable is the municipal property tax multiplier in
percent. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. SL indicates the spatial lag model, SD the spatial Durbin model, SL
IV the spatial lag instrumental variable model. N.N. denotes the number of nearest neighbors used in the
definition of spatial weighting matrices. Inv. D. denotes the inverse distance spatial weighting matrix.
SL Model SL Model SD Model SL IV
(10 N.N.) (Inv. D.) (10 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Municipalities in high-homeownership regions (N=4,171) 0.718*** 0.966*** 0.737*** 0.902***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.033)
Municipalities in low-homeownership regions (N=3,865) 0.485*** 0.648*** 0.572*** 0.611***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.024) (0.041)
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Figures
Figure 1: Property Tax Multipliers across German Municipalities
This figure is based on data from the German Federal Statistical Office and shows the geographical
distribution of property tax multipliers in percent across Western German municipalities in 2011.
39
Figure 2: Homeownership Rates across German Municipalities
This figure is based on data from the 2011 Census and shows the geographical distribution of the pro-
portion of owner-occupied housing units in percent across Western German municipalities in 2011.
40
Figure 3: Density Distributions of Tax Multipliers
The figure is based on data from the Federal Statistical Office and shows Kernel estimates of the em-
pirical density distribution of tax multipliers grouped by local proportions of owner-occupied housing.
Property tax multiplier distributions are grouped by municipalities with above-median and below-median
homeownership rate, indicated by solid and dashed lines, respectively.
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Abstract
This paper investigates whether and how strongly the share of homeowners in a com-
munity affects residential property taxation by local governments. Different from
renters, homeowners bear the full property tax burden irrespective of local market
conditions, and the tax is more salient to them. “Homeowner communities” may
hence oppose high property taxes in order to protect their housing wealth. Using
granular spatial data from a complete housing inventory in the 2011 German Census
and historical war damages as a source of exogenous variation in local homeown-
ership, we provide empirical evidence that otherwise identical jurisdictions charge
significantly lower property taxes when the share of homeowners in their popula-
tion is higher. This result is invariant to local market conditions, which suggests tax
salience as the key mechanism behind this effect. We find positive spatial depen-
dence in tax multipliers, indicative of property tax mimicking by local governments.
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Table IntA.1: Results of Further Alternative Spatial Specifications
This table shows regression results for additional spatial specifications of Equation (7). The dependent
variable is the 2011 municipal property tax multiplier in percent. ***, ** and * denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. SE indicates
the spatial error model, SL the spatial lag model, SAC the mixed-regressive spatial model. N.N. denotes
the number of nearest neighbors used in the definition of spatial weighting matrices. Inv. D. denotes the
inverse distance spatial weighting matrix.
SL Model SL Model SAC Model
(20 N.N.) (30 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Constant 105.997*** 130.555*** 436.859***
(9.937) (7.772) (15.854)
Pct. owner-occupied -0.201*** -0.214*** -0.230***
(0.062) (0.050) (0.053)
Spending p.c. 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt p.c. 0.001 0.001 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business tax p.c. -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Income/VAT p.c. -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.053***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Tax base p.c. (1,000s) -0.027 -0.025 0.029
(0.055) (0.044) (0.044)
Population (1,000s) 0.475*** 0.468*** 0.445***
(0.096) (0.046) (0.043)
Population2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.179***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.023)
Income p.c. (1,000s) -0.215 -0.261* -0.277*
(0.234) (0.154) (0 .149)
Pct. unemployed 0.535*** 0.513** 0.643***
(0.247) (0.250) (0.242)
Pct. < 10 years 0.230 0.261 0.190
(0.247) (0.266) (0.251)
Pct. > 70 years 0.419*** 0.421*** 0.388***
(0.062) (0.151) (0.151)
Pct. left-wing votes 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.269***
(0.048) (0.050) (0.064)
D nation/state border 2.353** 2.593*** 4.990***
(1.148) (1.126) (1.430)
D pop > 100,000 4.753 4.444 3.101
(14.330) (8.402) (7.787)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes
λ 0.691*** 0.615*** 0.839***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013)
ρ - - -0.458***
- - (0.044)
Spatially lagged cov. - - -
Wald test: lag. cov.=0 - - -
# obs. 8,036 8,036 8,036
Squared corr. coeff. 0.349 0.359 0.371
Moran’s I residuals 0.061 0.028 0.535
Table IntA.2: First-stage Regression Results for Spatial Lag IV Model
This table shows results for the first stage of the spatial lag instrumental variable regression. The
dependent variable is the 2011 municipal share of homeownership in percent. Excluded instruments
from the second-stage equation are the historical district percentage of housing damaged by warfare and
historical district-level percentage of housing owner-occupied in 1950. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Constant 48.76***
(2.273)
District pct. housing damaged in 1950 -0.031***
(0.008)
District pct. housing owner-occupied 1950 0.028***
(0.006)
Spending p.c. -0.000
(0.000)
Debt p.c. 0.000
(0.000)
Business tax p.c. -0.001***
(0.000)
Income/VAT p.c. -0.001
(0.003)
Tax base p.c. (1,000s) -0.207***
(0.032)
Population (1,000s) -0.173***
(0.025)
Population2 0.000***
(0.000)
Population density -0.077***
(0.007)
Income p.c. (1,000s) 0.075
(0.060)
Pct. unemployed -0.946***
(0.312)
Pct. < 10 years -0.117
(0.076)
Pct. > 70 years -0.076*
(0.046)
Pct. left-wing votes -0.023
(0.015)
D nation/state border -0.608**
(0.242)
D pop > 100,000 18.426***
(2.273)
State dummies Yes
λ 0.468***
(0.016)
# obs. 8,036
Squared corr. coeff. 0.378
Table IntA.3: Full Regression Results for Local Housing Vacancy Rate Split
This table shows regression results for five alternative specifications of Equation (7), where the home-
ownership share is replaced by interaction terms between homeownership share and a dummy variable
indicating rental housing vacancy above and below the highest quartile of the sample vacancy rate dis-
tribution. The dependent variable is the 2011 municipal property tax multiplier in percent times 100.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. N.N. denotes the number of nearest neighbors used in the definition of spatial
weighting matrices. Inv. D. denotes the inverse distance spatial weighting matrix.
OLS SL Model SL Model SD Model SL IV
(10 N.N.) (Inv. D.) (10 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Constant 317.886*** 131.150*** 60.533*** 116.466*** 82.284***
(8.960) (9.547) (12.076) (15.744) (18.927)
Pct. owner-occupied * D(high vacancy) -0.195*** -0.210*** -0.197*** -0.248*** -0.284**
(0.068) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.144)
Pct. owner-occupied * D(low vacancy) -0.208*** -0.224*** -0.215*** -0.259*** -0.286*
(0.070) (0.063) (0.065) (0.069) (0.153)
Spending p.c. 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Debt p.c. 0.003*** 0.000 0.001** 0.003** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business tax p.c. -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income/VAT p.c. -0.082*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.048*** -0.057***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Tax base p.c. (1,000s) -0.129* -0.060 -0.047 0.0210 -0.071
(0.068) (0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.064)
Population (1,000s) 0.546*** 0.469*** 0.464*** 0.470*** 0.454***
(0.089) (0.093) (0.095) (0.088) (0.096)
Population2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.090*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.198*** 0.067**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029)
Income p.c. (1,000s) -0.333 -0.259 -0.211 -0.227 -0.223
(0.238) (0.236) (0.235) (0.251) (0.236)
Pct. unemployed 0.239 0.497** 0.441* 0.554** 0.374
(0.238) (0.235) (0.227) (0.265) (0.262)
Pct. < 10 years -0.005 0.224 0.208 0.155 0.173
(0.298) (0.255) (0.272) (0.258) (0.277)
Pct. > 70 years 0.534*** 0.407*** 0.399** 0.362** 0.419**
(0.177) (0.151) (0.161) (0.159) (0.175)
Pct. left-wing votes 0.231*** 0.164*** 0.147*** 0.280*** 0.149***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.050) (0.065) (0.051)
D nation/state border 1.692 2.592 2.636** 5.729*** 2.512**
(1.285) (1.165) (1.230) (1.564) (1.234)
D pop > 100,000 3.989 4.204 3.865 3.751 5.648
(13.471) (14.144) (14.375) (13.867) (14.435)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
λ - 0.615*** 0.850*** 0.668*** 0.800***
- (0.017) (0.268) (0.017) (0.034)
Spatially lagged cov. - - - Yes -
Wald test: lag. cov.=0 - - - 420.51*** -
# obs. 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036 8,036
R2 0.385 - - - -
Squared corr. coeff. - 0.359 0.302 0.398 -
Table IntA.4: Full Regression Results for Municipalities within High-Homeownership Re-
gions
This table shows regression results for four alternative specifications of Equation (7), where only mu-
nicipalities are considered that are located within regions of high average homeownership rates. The
dependent variable is the 2011 municipal property tax multiplier in percent times 100. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. N.N. denotes the number of nearest neighbors used in the definition of spatial weighting
matrices. Inv. D. denotes the inverse distance spatial weighting matrix.
SL Model SL Model SD Model SL IV
(10 N.N.) (Inv. D.) (10 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Constant 101.891*** 30.564** 127.445*** -0.032
(12.917) (12.151) (20.873) (31.500)
Pct. owner-occupied -0.169** -0.144* -0.148* 0.081
(0.079) (0.082) (0.084) (0.236)
Spending p.c. 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt p.c. -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Business tax p.c. -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income/VAT p.c. -0.026 -0.030 -0.024 -0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
Tax base p.c. (1,000s) -0.021 -0.067 0.034 0.055
(0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.074)
Population (1,000s) 0.664*** 0.618*** 0.790*** 0.843***
(0.178) (0.183) (0.182) (0.225)
Population2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population density 0.046 0.069 0.118* 0.098
(0.051) (0.046) (0.061) (0.063)
Income p.c. (1,000s) -0.538 -0.614 -0.662 -0.566
(0.565) (0.550) (0.586) (0.563)
Pct. unemployed 0.177 0.296 0.152 0.544
(0.211) (0.239) (0.196) (0.353)
Pct. < 10 years 0.085 -0.030 0.002 -0.036
(0.290) (0.309) (0.298) (0.296)
Pct. > 70 years 0.188 0.170 0.026 0.118
(0.163) (0.177) (0.173) (0.170)
Pct. left-wing votes 0.066 0.026 0.086 0.014
(0.050) (0.054) (0.068) (0.051)
D nation/state border 0.343 1.057 0.687 0.242
(1.520) (1.619) (2.118) (1.581)
D pop > 100,000 13.885 13.114 14.771 12.314
(32.675) (32.308) (33.321) (33.293)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
λ 0.718*** 0.966*** 0.737*** 0.902***
(0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.033)
Spatially lagged cov. - - Yes -
Wald test: lag. cov.=0 - - 238.87*** -
# obs. 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,171
Squared corr. coeff. 0.146 0.022 0.188 -
Table IntA.5: Full Regression Results for Municipalities within Low-Homeownership Re-
gions
This table shows regression results for four alternative specifications of Equation (7), where only mu-
nicipalities are considered that are located within regions of low average homeownership rates. The
dependent variable is the 2011 municipal property tax multiplier in percent times 100. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels. HAC-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. N.N. denotes the number of nearest neighbors used in the definition of spatial weighting
matrices. Inv. D. denotes the inverse distance spatial weighting matrix.
SL Model SL Model SD Model SL IV
(10 N.N.) (Inv. D.) (10 N.N.) (10 N.N.)
Constant 153.331*** 103.493*** 140.696*** 98.312***
(14.575) (17.346) (28.461) (23.013)
Pct. owner-occupied -0.291*** -0.283*** -0.385*** -0.092
(0.101) (0.102) (0.110) (0.187)
Spending p.c. 0.003*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Debt p.c. 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Business tax p.c. -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Income/VAT p.c. -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.064***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013)
Tax base p.c. (1,000s) -0.015 -0.029 0.004 0.017
(0.099) (0.098) (0.112) (0.102)
Population (1,000s) 0.431*** 0.449*** 0.413*** 0.479***
(0.101) (0.103) (0.096) (0.107)
Population2 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population density 0.065** 0.068** 0.174*** 0.084**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.003)
Income p.c. (1,000s) -0.216 -0.221 -0.103 -0.231
(0.190) (0.193) (0.191) (0.195)
Pct. unemployed 1.301*** 1.057** 1.174** 1.310**
(0.483) (0.455) (0.502) (0.533)
Pct. < 10 years 0.725 0.782 0.525 0.812
(0.484) (0.505) (0.493) (0.505)
Pct. > 70 years 0.813*** 0.881*** 0.873*** 0.892***
(0.305) (0.315) (0.332) (0.316)
Pct. left-wing votes 0.301*** 0.273*** 0.535*** 0.285***
(0.103) (0.105) (0.141) (0.105)
D nation/state border 2.207 1.524 7.979*** 1.575
(1.664) (1.718) (2.157) (1.724)
D pop > 100,000 3.119 0.961 5.374 -1.546
(16.451) (16.572) (16.278) (16.847)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
λ 0.485*** 0.648*** 0.572*** 0.611***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.024) (0.041)
Spatially lagged cov. - - Yes -
Wald test: lag. cov.=0 - - 249.33*** -
# obs. 3,865 3,865 3,865 3,865
Squared corr. coeff. 0.509 0.626 0.531 -
